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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE 
"
v[T]he initial inquiry of ai i;> coi n t si 101 ilci al • a> s be t :> deten i lii le whether 
the requested isdiction. When a matter is outside the court's 
jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the action.'" Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Leahy, 848 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted^ , ; ourr 
lacks jurisdiction because the filing oi ihc «>i iym;il < "uinplji ml mi Hit" - i 
Residents ofT r committee (the "Clear Air Committee") was a 
void filing, and no valid filing seeking judicial review was made before the expiration 
of the statutory period for seeking judicial review.1 
The filing of the original Complaint was voi '^ums : v\.^ . * . • 
member :t : e oi I bel lalf of the Cle ar \ir Committee, even 
though the Clear Air Committee, as an entity, cannot represent itself in Utah's courts. 
The filing is also void because the Clear Air Committee failed to register its assumed 
name with the Division of Corporations and Commercial < "ode, w Im li l.uluu' IKUS ilk 
mittee's access u i ihi \ on I , M,n I ( n .iham's ("Graham's") substitution as plaintiff 
was improper because he lacks standing to seek judicial review on a records request 
1
 As the District indicated in its opening brief, it would prefer a resolution 
on the merits. The District raises the jurisdictional issue because it is a real issue in 
this case and the integrity of the system requires addressing it. 
made by the Clear Air Committee. In any event, his substitution commenced a new, 
untimely action that did not relate back to the original filing. 
A. The Clear Air Committee's Complaint Seeking Judicial Review 
Was Void 
The Clear Air Committee requested records from the District.2 R. 3, 23, 
246-47. The Clear Air Committee, representing itself pro se through Graham, filed a 
Complaint in the trial court seeking judicial review of the District's Administrative 
Control Board's decision concerning its records request. R. 1,6, 247. Graham was 
not an elected official of the Clear Air Committee, but only one of a number of 
members. R. 67. Graham was not licensed to practice as an attorney in Utah. R. 146. 
As an alleged "non-profit organization dedicated to minimizing air 
pollution in Davis County," R. 1, the Clear Air Committee is an artificial entity, is 
forbidden to practice law in Utah, and had to be represented in court by a licensed 
attorney. Tracy-Burke Assoc, v. Department of Employment Sec, 699 P. 2d 687, 688 
(Utah 1985); Turtle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass % 350 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1960); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 (1997). Therefore, the Complaint filed by the Clear Air 
Committee was "void by reason of the [committee's] lack of power to represent itself in 
an action in court." Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P.2d 867, 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) 
2
 The "District" means collectively defendants, appellees, and cross-
appellants Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special 
Service District, the District's Administrative Control Board, and LeGrand Bitter, the 
District's Executive Director. 
2 
(cited with approval in Tracy-Burke, 699 P.2d at 688 and Turtle, 350 P.2d at 618) 
(emphasis added). 
Contrary to Graham's arguments, Tracy-Burke controls this case. In each 
case, the complaining party was an artificial entity. In Tracy-Burke, the entity was a 
corporation registered in Utah; here, the entity was a voluntary association. Each 
sought judicial review of an administrative agency's decision. In Tracy-Burke, the 
administrative proceedings were before the Industrial Commission, and in this case they 
were before the District's Administrative Control Board. The cases are different in that 
the person pursuing the litigation for the corporation in Tracy-Burke was the president 
of the corporation, while Graham is not an officer of the Clear Air Committee, but only 
one of a number of members. In Tracy-Burke, when it was established that the 
petitioner was "a corporation not represented by a licensed attorney," its petition for 
review was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of jurisdiction. Tracy-Burke, 699 
P.2d at 688. The district court similarly lacked jurisdiction over this case because it 
was initiated by an organization that purported to represent itself without a licensed 
attorney. The case was void when it was filed. 
The Clear Air Committee was also subject to Utah's Assumed Name 
Statute, and its failure to comply therewith precluded its access to Utah's courts. 
Under the Assumed Name Statute, any "individual, association, partnership, 
corporation, or otherwise" that "carries on, conducts, or transacts business in this state 
3 
under an assumed name" is prohibited from appearing in Utah's courts unless it 
registers its name with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 42-2-5, -10 (1997) (emphasis added). 
"Business" is defined broadly as "one's work, occupation, or profession; 
a special task, duty, or function; rightful concern or responsibility (no one's 
business but his own); a matter, affair, activity, etc. (the business of packing for a 
trip); the buying and selling of commodities and services; commerce; trade . . . ." 
Webster's New World Dictionary 192 (2d College ed. 1980) (emphasis added). The 
Clear Air Committee acted as a "non-profit organization dedicated to minimizing air 
pollution in Davis County," R. 1, and "lobb[ied] elected officials in order to influence 
the County's solid waste management policy." R. 130. Accordingly, the Clear Air 
Committee engaged in activities that constituted "business" and was subject to the 
requirements of Utah's Assumed Name Statute. 
The Clear Air Committee failed to file an assumed name registration 
before the 30-day period following the District Administrative Control Board's denial 
of its GRAMA appeal, which was the time limit for seeking judicial review. R. 93-96. 
As such, the Clear Air Committee was barred from access to the courts, and its suit, 
when brought, was void and should have been dismissed. 
4 
B. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Over the Amended 
Complaint Because It Was Not Timely 
It is essential that the Court keep in mind that this matter came to the 
district court as an action seeking judicial review of an administrative decision, not as a 
brand new action. The Utah Supreme Court has held that in the context of seeking 
judicial review of an administrative decision, 
[w]here the time limit passes without the application being 
made, the right of the court to take cognizance of the party's 
grievance is cut off by operation of law. Such a limitation 
of the right of a court to hear an appeal from an 
administrative decision has been commonly held to be 
jurisdictional in nature. 
UtahDep'tofBus. Regulation, Div. of Public Utilities, Bus. Tel. Sys. v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). Unlike a statute of 
limitations defense, which can be waived by a party's failure to assert the statute as an 
affirmative defense, Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1983), or which can be tolled by an agreement of the parties,3 "a court's lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a dispute may not be waived by the parties." 
Utah DepV of Bus. Regulation, 602 P.2d at 699. 
3
 See United Resources 1988-1 Drilling & Completion Program, L.P. v. 
Morris, 125 F.3d 864, 864 n.l (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing tolling agreement); accord 
Bernstein v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1395, 1398 (10th Cir. 1990); Queen Uno Ltd. 
Partnership v. CoeurD'AleneMines Corp., 2 F. Supp.2d 1345, 1360 (D. Colo. 1998); 
Mickv. Brewer, 923 F. Supp. 181, 186 (D. Kan. 1996). 
5 
In Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this 
Court addressed whether the Draper City Council had jurisdiction over an appeal from 
a decision of the city's planning commission permitting certain lot owners to build a 
house. In interpreting the applicable appeal ordinance, this Court noted that the word 
"shall" mandated that an appeal be filed within 14 days of the planning commission's 
decision. Id. at 1047-48 (citing Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1974)). Neighboring landowners appealed the planning commission's decision to the 
city council after 14 days expired. The lot owners objected based on a lack of 
jurisdiction. This Court explained that "if Draper City wishes to set time limits for 
appeals of the Draper City Planning Commission's decisions that allow some flexibility 
for considerations of equity, it is free to do so . . . [however] it must so state." Id. at 
1048. The Court concluded that the city council lacked jurisdiction over the late-filed 
appeal because the time period was jurisdictional, not advisory, and not subject to 
equity considerations. Id. at 1047-48. 
In this case, statutory terms command that "[t]he requestor shall file a 
petition no later than . . . 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the 
records request by either providing the requested records or denying the request in 
whole or in part." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(i) (1997) (emphasis added). Like 
the time period in Brendle, this period is jurisdictional, not advisory, and not subject 
to equity considerations. Accord Utah Dep't Bus. Regulation, 602 P.2d at 699-700. 
6 
Where the original Complaint was void when it was filed by the Clear Air Committee 
and the jurisdictional 30-day period for seeking judicial review passed shortly thereafter 
without a valid complaint being filed, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the 
case. 
It is irrelevant whether Graham allegedly "filed his motion [to amend] 
promptly after learning that the Committee was not the proper party to seek review of 
the records decision" or that Graham named the committee as plaintiff based on an 
alleged "lack of procedural knowledge." Aplt.'s Res. Br. at 2. The critical fact is 
whether the filing was within the time prescribed by statute. It was not. 
Moreover, the district court erred when it concluded that Graham's 
substitution as plaintiff on November 18, 1997 could relate back to the date of the 
original filing. By statute, judicial review of a decision on a records request can only 
be sought by the "requestor" of the record. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(a) (1997) 
("A requestor may petition for judicial review by the district court . . .") (emphasis 
added).4 Here, the Clear Air Committee was the requestor and the party that appealed 
to the District's Administrative Control Board. R. 3-4, 6. As such, the right to 
judicial review belonged to the committee. Graham was not the alter ego of the Clear 
Air Committee and lacked standing to seek judicial review. He admitted that he was 
4
 The District's GRAMA ordinance provides that judicial review of a 
decision of the District's Administrative Control Board shall be governed by Utah Code 
Ann. §63-2-404. R. 103. 
7 
only one member, not an elected official, and had no authority to represent the 
committee. R. 67, 146. Whether Graham was "personally responsible for the records 
request" is immaterial because a corporation, association, or any other artificial entity 
created by law always acts in its affairs through individuals, but those individuals retain 
separate identities from the entity. Aplt.'s Resp. Br. at 3; see also Paradise, 195 P.2d 
at 867 (explaining that out of court an artificial entity must act through its 
representatives). 
Thus, Graham was erroneously allowed to be substituted as plaintiff 
because he was not the requestor of the records and lacked standing to seek judicial 
review. At best, his substitution as plaintiff commenced an entirely new action that 
began long after the jurisdictional 30-day time period for seeking judicial review. 
Thus, the district court lacked—and this Court lacks—jurisdiction over Graham's 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The filing of the original Complaint by the Clear Air Committee was void 
because it was brought in a Utah court pro se by an artificial entity that was not 
represented by an attorney. Utah's Assumed Name Statute also barred the committee's 
access to the courts during the jurisdictional 30-day time period for seeking judicial 
review because the committee had not registered its name. Because the original 
Complaint was void, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter because a valid 
8 
complaint was not filed within the time period required for seeking judicial review of a 
decision on a records request. Graham's substitution as plaintiff did not relate back to 
the original filing because he is not the Clear Air Committee and lacks standing to seek 
judicial review. At best, his substitution as plaintiff created a new action that was 
untimely. This appeal should be dismissed. 
DATED this 2 3 day of December, 1998. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
1 W^OA^^KUOQQA^ 
Larry S. Jenkins 
Susan J. Mueller 
Attorneys for 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants/Defendants 
9 
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ADDENDUM 
42-1-2 NAMES 7 
42-1-2. Not ice of h e a r i n g — O r d e r of c h a n g e . 
The court shall order what, if any, notice shall be given of 
the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may 
order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open 
court of the allegations of the petition and that there exists 
proper cause for granting the same. 1953 
42-1-3. Effect of p r o c e e d i n g s . 
Such proceedings shall in no manner affect any legal action 
or proceeding then pending, or any right, title or interest 
whatsoever. 1953 
CHAPTER 2 
CONDUCTING BUSINESS UNDER ASSUMED NAME 
Section 
42-2-1 to 42-2-4. Repealed. 
42-2-5. Certificate of assumed and of true name - Con-
tents — Execution — Filing. 
42-2-6 Change in persons transacting busmen •.• ^-r 
assumed name. 
42-2-6.5. Repealed. 
42-2-6.6. Assumed name. 
42-2-7. Index — Fees — Evidence. 
42-2-8. Expiration of filing — Notice — Removal from 
active index. 
42-2-9. Corporate names, limited liability company 
names, and trademark, service mark, and 
trade name rights not affected. 
42-2-10. Penalties. 
42-2-11. Persons doing business under assumed name to 
have registered office and registered agent — 
Penalties — Presumption of registered agent. 
42-2-1 to 42-2-4. Repea led . 1963 
42-2-5. Cert i f icate of a s s u m e d a n d of t r u e n a m e — 
C o n t e n t s — Execut ion — Filing. 
(1) Every person who carries on, conducts, or transacts 
business in this state under an assumed name, whether that 
business is carried on, conducted, or transacted as an indi-
vidual, association, partnership, corporation, or otherwise, 
shall file with the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code a certificate setting forth: 
(a) the name under which the business is, or is to be 
carried on, conducted, or transacted, and the full true 
name, or names, of the person owning, and the person 
carrying on, conducting, or transacting the business; 
(b) the location of the principal place of business, and 
the street address of the person. 
(2) The certificate shall be executed by the person owning, 
and the person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the 
business, and shall be filed not later than 30 days after the 
time of commencing to carry on, conduct, or transact the 
business. 
(3) "Filed" means the Division of Corporations and Com-
mercial Code has received and approved, as to form, a docu-
ment submitted under the provisions of this chapter, and has 
marked on the face of the document a stamp or seal indicating 
the time of day and date of approval, the name of the division, 
the division director's signature and division seal, or facsimi-
les of the signature or seal. 1990 
42-2-6. C h a n g e in p e r s o n s transact ing business under 
a s s u m e d name. 
An amended certificate shall be filed with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code not later than 30 days 
after any change in the person or persons owning, carrying on, 
conducting, or transacting such business or a change in the 
registered agent or office of the business or in any informat: 
required to be filed with the Division of Corporations a 
Commercial Code under this act. l 
42-2-6.5. Repealed. l 
42-2-6.6. Assumed name. 
(1) The assumed name: 
(a) may not contain any word or phrase that indica-
or implies that the business is organized for any purpc 
other than one or more of the purposes contained in 
application; 
(b) shall be distinguishable from any registered nai 
or trademark of record in the offices of the Division 
Corporations and Commercial Code, as defined in Subs* 
tion 16-10a-401(5), except as authorized by the Division 
Corporations and Commercial Code pursuant to Subsi 
tion (2); and 
(c) may not, without the written consent of the Unit 
States Olympic Committee, contain the words "Olympi 
"Olympiad," or "Citius Altius Fortius." 
(2) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Co 
shall authorize the use of the name applied for if the name 
distinguishable from one or more of the names and trac 
marks that are on the division's records, or if the applica 
delivers to the division a certified copy of the final judgment 
a court of competent jurisdiction establishing the applican 
right to use the name applied for in this state. 
(3) The assumed name, for purposes of recordation, shall 
either translated into English or transliterated into letters 
the English alphabet if it is not in English. 
(4) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code m 
not approve an application for an assumed name to any persi 
violating the provisions of this section. 
(5) The director of the Division of Corporations and Coi 
mercial Code shall have the power and authority reasonafc 
necessary to interpret and efficiently administer this sectii 
and to perform the duties herein imposed upon the division I 
this section 
(6) A name which implies by any word in the name that 
is an agency of the state or of any of its political subdivisior 
if it is not actually such a legally established agency, may n 
be approved for filing by the Division of Corporations ai 
Commercial Code. 
(7) The provisions of Section 16-10a-403 apply to this cha 
ter ' .' 
42-2-7. Index — Fees — Evidence. 
(1) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Co< 
shall: 
(a) keep an active alphabetical index of all persoi 
filing the certificates provided for in this chapter; and 
(b) collect the required indexing and filing fees. 
(2) A copy of any such certificate certified by the Division 
Corporations and Commercial Code shall be presumpth 
evidence of the facts contained in the certificate. 19: 
42-2-8. Expiration of filing — Not ice — Removal froi 
active index. 
A filing under this chapter shall be effective for a period < 
three years from the date of filing. At the expiration of thu 
period, if no new filing is made by or on behalf of the perse 
who made the original filing, the Division of Corporations an 
Commercial Code shall send a notice by regular mail, postag 
prepaid, to the address shown in the filing indicating that 
has expired. If no new filing is made within 30 days after th 
date of mailing the notice, the Division of Corporations an 
Commercial Code shall remove the name from the actrv 
alphabetical index, and place it on a permanent inactrv 
alphabetical index. 19* 
751 NEGOTIABLE CERTIFICATES 43-1-1 
42-2-9. Corporate names, l imited liability company 
names, and trademark, service mark, and 
trade name rights not affected. 
(1) This chapter does not affect or apply to any corporation 
organized under the laws of any state if it does business under 
its true corporate name. 
(2) This chapter does not affect the statutory or common 
law trademark, service mark, or trade name rights granted by 
state or federal statute. 
(3) This chapter does not affect or apply to any limited 
liability company doing business in this state under its true 
name. 1992 
42-2-10. Penalt ies . 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business 
under an assumed name without having complied with the 
provisions of this chapter, and until the provisions of this 
chapter are complied with: 
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, 
suit, counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any 
of the courts of this state; and 
(2) may be subject to a penalty in the form of a late 
filing fee determined by the division director in an amount 
not to exceed three times the fees charged under Section 
42-2-7 and established under Section 63-38-3.2. 1994 
42-2-11. Persons doing bus iness under assumed name 
to have registered office and registered agent 
— Penalt ies — Presumpt ion of registered 
agent. 
'(1) (a) Any person conducting or transacting business in 
this state under an assumed name under this chapter 
shall, for service of process purposes, comply with and be 
subject to Sections 16- 10a-501 through 16-10a-504, as 
though he were a corporation. 
(b) If the person conducting business or transacting 
business in this state under an assumed name under this 
chapter is a foreign corporation, it must be qualified to 
conduct or transact business under the provisions of 
Sections 16-10a-1501 through 16-10a-1511. 
(2) If a person fails to maintain a registered office or 
registered agent as required by Sections 16-10a-501 and 
16-10a-502, the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code shall mail a notice to him that the filing will be canceled 
if a registered office and registered agent are not designated. 
If the registered office and registered agent are not designated 
within 30 days after the date of mailing the notice, the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall remove 
the name from the alphabetical index, place it on a permanent 
inactive alphabetical index, and mail a notice to the applicant 
that the filing has been canceled. 
(3) The person filing a certificate under Section 42-2-5 shall 
be presumed to be the registered agent if the person is a 
resident of this state, and the person's Utah address shall be 
presumed to be the registered office for purposes of this 
chapter. 1992 
CHAPTER 3 
REGISTRATION OF FARM NAMES 
Section 
42-3-1. Commissioner of agriculture and food to register 
names. 
42-3-2. Recording fee. 
42-3-3. Transfer of name. 
42-3-4. Cancellation by owner — Fee. 
42-3-5. Use of name by another — Penalty. 
42-3-1. Commissioner of agriculture and food to regis-
ter names. 
Any owTner of a farm in this state may have the name of his 
farm, together with a brief description of his lands to which 
such name applies, recorded in a register kept for the purpose 
in the office of the commissioner of agriculture and food, and 
the commissioner of agriculture and food shall furnish to such 
landowner a proper certificate setting forth such name and a 
brief description of such lands. When any name shall have 
been so recorded it shall not be recorded as the name of any 
other farm. ww 
42-3-2. Recording fee. 
Any person having the name of his farm so recorded shall 
first pay to the commissioner of agriculture and food a fee 
determined by the commissioner pursuant to Section 63-38-
3.2. This fee shall be transmitted to the General Fund. law 
42-3-3. Transfer of name. 
When any owner of a farm, the name of which has been 
recorded as provided in this chapter, transfers by deed 01 
otherwise the whole of such farm, the transfer may include the 
registered name thereof; but, if the owner shall transfer only 
a portion of such farm, the registered name thereof shall not 
be deemed transferred, unless so stated in the conveyance. 
1955 
42-3-4. Cancellation by owner — Fee . 
When any owner of a registered farm desires to cancel its 
registered name, he shall write on the back of the certificate 
the following: "This name is canceled, and I hereby release all 
rights thereunder," and shall sign such statement in the 
presence of a witness and file the same in the office of the 
commissioner of agriculture and food. For such filing the 
commissioner of agriculture and food shall charge a fee 
determined by the commissioner pursuant to Section 63-38-
3.2, which shall be paid to the General Fund. The commis-
sioner of agriculture and food shall, when such certificate sc 
endorsed has been filed in his office, write on the margin of the 
register of such name the word "canceled." 1991 
42-3-5. Use of name by another — Penalty. 
It is a misdemeanor for any person other than the person ir 
whose name a farm is registered to use such registered name 
for any other farm. 1955 
TITLE 43 
NEGOTIABLE CERTIFICATES 
Chapter 
1. General Provisions. 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 
43-1-1. "Security receipt," "equipment t rust certificate" de 
fined. 
43-1-2. Transfer — By delivery — By endorsement -
Rights of transferee. 
43-1-3. Restrictive construction of title — Effective date. 
43-1-1. "Security receipt,'' "equipment trust certifi 
cate" denned. 
For the purpose of this title: 
The term "security receipt" means any writing in and b] 
which the signer sets forth that the person named thereii 
or the bearer, is entitled to r^^eive a specified principa 
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(b) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(i) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2 
401(l)(b) occur; and 
(ii.) the chief administrative officer failed to make a 
determination under Section 63-2-401. 
(2) The notice of appeal shall contain the following infor-
mation: 
(a) the petitioner's name, mailing address, and da\ 
time telephone number; 
(b) a copy of any denial of the records request; and 
(c) the relief sought. 
(3) The petitioner may file a short statement of facts, 
reasons, and legal authority in support of the appeal. 
(4) No later than three business days after receiving a 
notice of appeal, the executive secretary of the records com-
mittee shall: 
(a) schedule a hearing for the records committee to 
discuss the appeal at the next regularly scheduled com-
mittee meeting falling at least 14 days after the date the 
notice of appeal is filed but no longer than 45 days after 
the date the notice of appeal was filed provided, however, 
the records committee may schedule an expedited hearing 
upon application of the petitioner and good cause shown; 
(b) send a copy of the notice of hearing to the petitioner; 
and 
(c) send a copy of the notice of appeal, supporting 
statement, and a notice of hearing to: 
(i) each member of the records committee; 
(ii) the records officer and the chief administrative 
officer of the governmental entity from which the 
appeal originated; 
(hi) any person who made a business confidential-
ity claim under Section 63-2-308 for a record that is 
the subject of the appeal; and 
(iv) all persons who participated in the proceed-
ings before the governmental entity's chief adminis-
trative officer. 
(5) (a) A written statement of facts, reasons, and legal 
authority in support of the governmental entity's position 
must be submitted to the executive secretary of the 
records committee not later than five business days before 
the hearing. 
(b) The governmental entity shall send a copy of the 
written statement to the petitioner by first class mail, 
postage prepaid. The executive secretary shall forward a 
copy of the written statement to each member of the 
records committee. 
(6) No later than ten business days after the notice of 
appeal is sent by the executive secretary, a person whose legal 
interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding may 
file a request for intervention before the records committee. 
Any written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in 
support of the intervener's position shall be filed with the 
request for intervention. The person seeking intervention 
shall provide copies of the statement to all parties to the 
proceedings before the records committee. 
(7) The records committee shall hold a hearing within the 
period of time described in Subsection (4). 
(8) At the hearing, the records committee shall allow the 
parties to testify, present evidence, and comment on the 
issues. The records committee may allow other interested 
persons to comment on the issues. 
(9) (a) The records committee may review the disputed 
records. However, if the committee is weighing the vari-
ous interests under Subsection (11), the committee must 
review the disputed records. The review shall be in 
camera. 
(b) Members of the records committee may not disclose 
any information or record reviewed by the committee in 
camera unless the disclosure is otherwise authorized by 
this chapter. 
(10) (a) Discovery is prohibited, but the records committee 
may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel production 
of necessary evidence. 
(b) The records committee's review shall be de novo. 
(11) (a) No later than three business days after the hear-
ing, the records committee shall issue a signed order 
either granting the petition in whole or in part or uphold-
ing the determination of the governmental entity in whole 
or in part. 
(b) The records committee may, upon consideration and 
weighing of the various interests and public policies 
pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclo-
sure, order the disclosure of information properly classi-
fied as private, controlled, or protected if the public 
interest favoring access outweighs the interest favoring 
restriction of access. 
(c) In making a determination under Subsection (b), 
the records committee shall consider and, where appro-
priate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of 
the record in order to protect privacy interests in the case 
of private or controlled records, business confidentiality 
interests in the case of records protected under Subsec-
tions 63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the 
public interest in the case of other protected records. 
(12) The order of the records committee shall include: 
(a) a statement of reasons for the decision, including 
citations to this chapter, court rule or order, another state 
statute, federal statute, or federal regulation that governs 
disclosure of the record, provided that the citations do not 
disclose private, controlled, or protected information; 
(b) a description of the record or portions of the recorc 
to which access was ordered or denied, provided that the 
description does not disclose private, controlled, or pro 
tected information or information exempt from disclosure 
under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b); 
(c) a statement that any party to the proceeding before 
the records committee may appeal the records commit 
tee's decision to district court; and 
(d) a brief summary of the appeals process, the timi 
limits for filing an appeal, and a notice that in order U 
protect its rights on appeal, the party may wish to seel 
advice from an attorney. 
(13) If the records committee fails to issue a decision withii 
35 days of the filing of the notice of appeal, that failure shal 
be considered the equivalent of an order denying the appeal 
The petitioner shall notify the records committee in writing i 
he considers the appeal denied. 199 
63-2-404. J u d i c i a l review. 
(1) (a) xAny party to a proceeding before the records com 
mittee may petition for judicial review by the distric 
court of the records committee's order. 
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 day 
after the date of the records committee's order. 
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to th 
petition for judicial review. 
(d) The executive secretary of the records committe 
shall be served with notice of the petition in accordanc 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by th 
district court of a governmental entity's determination a 
specified in Subsection 63-2-402 (1Kb). 
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has n 
sponded to the records request by either providin 
the requested records or denying the request in who! 
or in part; 
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(ii) 35 days after the original request if the govern-
mental entity failed to respond to the request; or 
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records 
if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 
63-2-401(l)(b) occur; and 
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to 
make a determination under Section 63-2-401. 
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall 
contain: 
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address; 
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which 
the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a prior 
appeal to the records committee; 
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental 
entity that issued the initial determination with a copy of 
tha t determination; 
. (d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of 
relief requested; and 
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is 
entitled to relief. 
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a 
protected record, the court shall allow the claimant of business 
confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the claim 
of business confidentiality. 
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district 
court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The 
review shall be in camera. 
(7) The court shall: 
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of 
evidence presented to the records committee; 
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a 
jury; and 
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportu-
nity. 
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of 
the various interests and public policies pertinent to the 
classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the 
disclosure of information properly classified as private, 
controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access 
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, 
limit the requester's use and further disclosure of the 
record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of 
private or controlled records, business confidentiality in-
terests in the case of records protected under Subsections 
63-2-304(1) and (2), and privacy interests or the public 
interest in the case of other protected records. 1995 
63-2-405. Confidential treatment of records for wh ich 
no exemption applies. 
(1) A court may, on appeal or in a declaratory or other 
action, order the confidential t reatment of records for which no 
exemption from disclosure applies if: 
(a) there are compelling interests favoring restriction 
of access to the record; and 
(b) the interests favoring restriction of access clearly 
outweigh the interests favoring access. 
(2) If a governmental entity requests a court to restrict 
access to a record under this section, the court shall require 
the governmental entity to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred by the lead party in opposing the governmental 
entity's request, if: 
(a) the court finds that no statutory or constitutional 
exemption from disclosure could reasonably apply to the 
record in question; and 
(b) the court denies confidential t reatment under this 
section. 
(3) This section does not apply to records that are specii 
cally required to be public under statutory provisions outsic 
of this chapter or under Section 63-2-301, except as provide 
in Subsection (4). 
(4) (a) Access to drafts and empirical data in drafts may 1 
limited under this section, but the court may consider, j 
its evaluation of interests favoring restriction of acces 
only those interests tha t relate to the underlying info 
mation, and not to the deliberative nature of the recorc 
(b) Access to original data in a computer program mz 
be limited under this section, but the court may conside 
in its evaluation of interests favoring restriction of acces 
only those interests that relate to the underlying info 
mation, and not to the status of that data as part of 
computer program. 19: 
PART 5 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE 
63-2-501. State Records Committee created — Men 
bership — Expenses . 
(1) There is created the State Records Committee with: 
the Department of Administrative Services to consist of tl 
following seven individuals: 
(a) an individual in the private sector whose professic 
requires him to create or manage records that if create 
by a governmental entity would be private or controllei 
(b). the state auditor or the auditor's designee; 
(c) the director of the Division of State History; 
(d) the governor or the governor's designee; 
(e) one citizen member; 
(f) one elected official representing political subdrv 
sions; and 
(g) one individual representing the news media. 
(2) The members specified in Subsections (l)(a), (e), (f), ar 
(g) shall be appointed by the governor with the advice ar 
consent of the Senate. 
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms 
current committee members expire, the governor sha 
appoint each new member or reappointed member to 
four-year term. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsectic 
(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment i 
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure th; 
the terms of committee members are staggered so th; 
approximately half of the committee is appointed eve: 
two years. 
(c) Each appointed member is eligible for reappoin 
ment for one additional term. 
(4) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for ar 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpirt 
term. 
(5) (a) (i) Members who are not government employe* 
shall receive no compensation or benefits for the 
services, but may receive per diem and expens< 
incurred in the performance of the member's offici 
duties at the rates established by the Division 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem ar 
expenses for their service, 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee membe 
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses fro 
their agency for their service may receive per die 
and expenses incurred in the performance of the 
official duties from the committee at the rates esta 
lished by the Division of Finance under Sectioi 
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
78-51-35 5< 
(2) upon the order of the court or judge thereof upon the 
application of the client, after notice to the attorney. 
1953 
78-51-35. Effect — Not ice of c h a n g e . 
When an attorney is changed as provided in Section 78-51-
34, written notice of the change and of the substitution of a 
new attorney or of the appearance of the party in person must 
be given to the adverse party; until then he must recognize the 
former attorney. 1.995 
78-51-36. Notice to a p p o i n t successor . 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases 
to act as such, a party to an action or proceeding for whom he 
was acting as attorney must, before any further proceedings 
are had against him be required by the adverse party, by 
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in 
person,,, 1,953 
78-51-37. Convict ion of crime — Judgment of disbar-
ment — Duty of clerks of court. 
Upon conviction of an attorney and counselor of felony, or 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, the judgment of the 
Supreme Court must be that the name of the accused be 
stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors of the court, 
and that he be precluded from practicing as such attorney or 
counselor in all the courts of this state; upon conviction in 
other cases, the judgment of the court may be, according to the 
gravity of the offense charged, deprivation of the right to 
practice as an attorney or counselor in the courts of this state 
permanently or for a limited period. The clerk of the court in 
which any such conviction is had must within thirty days 
thereafter transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of 
the record of conviction, which shall be conclusive evidence 
thereof. 1953 
78-51-38. S u r e t y s h i p —- A t t o r n e y fo rb idden to a s sume . 
No practicing attorney and counselor shall become a surety 
in any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which he is 
engaged as attorney. 1953 
78-51-39. Ce r t a in officials no t to p r a c t i c e law. 
Sheriffs, clerks of courts and constables, and their deputies, 
are prohibited from practicing law or acting as attorneys and 
counselors, or from having as a partner an attorney and 
counselor or anyone who acts as such. 1953 
78-51-40. Corporations and associat ions forbidden to 
p r a c t i c e — Excep t ions . 
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary asso-
ciation, except such as are organized for benevolent or chari-
table purposes, or organizations approved by the Supreme 
Court and formed for the purpose of assisting persons without 
means in the pursuit of civil remedies, to hold itself out to the 
public by advertisement or otherwise as being entitled to 
practice law or to furnish attorneys or counselors, or to render 
legal services or advice of any kind in any action or proceeding, 
or to solicit directly or indirectly any claim or demand for the 
purpose of bringing action thereon. Any corporation or volun-
tary association violating any of the provisions of this section 
is liable to a fine of not more than $5,000; and every officer, 
agent or employee of such corporation or voluntary association 
who directly or indirectly engages on behalf of such corpora-
tion or voluntary association in any of the acts herein prohib-
ited, or assists such corporation or voluntary association to do 
such prohibited acts, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The fact that 
such officer, agent or employee is a duly and regularly licensed 
attorney at law shall not be held to permit or allow any such 
corporation or voluntary association to do the acts prohibited 
herein, nor shall such fact be a defense upon the trial of any of 
the persons mentioned herein for a violation of the provisions 
of this section. 1953 
78-51-41. Compensat ion — Lien. 
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for servic 
is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is r 
restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, 
the service of an answer containing a counterclaim or at t 
time that the attorney and client enter into a wTritten or 01 
employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed h 
a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim, whi 
attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or jud 
ment in the client's favor and to the proceeds thereof 
whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected 1 
any settlement between the parties before or after judgmer 
Any written employment agreement shall contain a statemei 
that the attorney has a lien upon the client's cause of action • 
counterclaim. 19 
78-51-42. Refusing to pay over m o n e y — p e n a | t y . 
An attorney and counselor who receives money or properl 
of his client in the course of his professional business and wr. 
refuses to pay or deliver the same to the person entitle 
thereto within a reasonable time after demand is guilty of 
misdemeanor. 19J 
78-51-43. Exception — Demand for bond. 
When an attorney and counselor claims to be entitled to 
lien upon money or property of his client in his possession h 
is not liable to the penalty of Section 78-51-42, unless h 
neglects or refuses to pay or deliver such money or property t 
the person entitled thereto upon such person giving a bon 
with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of th 
district court, conditioned for the payment of the amount c 
such attorney's claim when legally established. 199 
78-51-44. Exception on giving bond. 
Nor shall the attorney and counselor be liable as aforesaid 
if he shall give a sufficient bond, to be approved by the clerk 0 
the district court, conditioned that he will pay or deliver tht 
whole or any portion of such money or property to the claimam 
in the event such claimant shall finally establish his righi 
thereto.. 
CHAPTERS 52 TO 55 
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CHAPTER 56 
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE UNTIL 
JANUARY 1, 1998] 
Section 
78-56-1. Repealed. 
78-56-1.1. Record of district court proceedings [Effective 
until January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-2. Duties of shorthand reporter [Repealed effec-
tive January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-3. Compensation — Traveling expenses — Fre-
quency of payment [Effective until January 
1, 1998]. 
78-56-4. Compensation — Transcripts and copies [Ef-
fective until January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-5. Assistant reporters — Duties — Compensation 
[Repealed effective January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-6. Certified transcripts prima facie correct [Effec-
tive until January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-7. Oath — Bond — Action on bond [Repealed 
effective January 1, 1998]. 
